Comments on: Kripke Contra Materialism http://www.framingbusiness.net/archives/406 Writings of Gavin C. Schmitt Tue, 07 Feb 2012 16:28:07 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.1.3 By: Jj http://www.framingbusiness.net/archives/406/comment-page-1#comment-305682 Jj Tue, 08 Nov 2011 00:46:34 +0000 http://framingbusiness.net/?p=406#comment-305682 Chris, What exactly is so hard to get here? Simply put, it is not contradictory to imagine pain without c-fibers firing. Hence, they is a possible world where pain exists and c-fibers do not, which implies that they are not identical, because if they were identical, it would be contradictory to affirm the existence of a possible world W where both P exists and P does not exist (if P stands for pain). And how could we not be in pain if we imagine we are in pain? Someone else may of course affirm that I am in pain, and of course in the strict Wittgensteinian sense that is the only real meaning of pain, but again, it is possible to imagine being in pain and having no one believe me. Chris,
What exactly is so hard to get here? Simply put, it is not contradictory to imagine pain without c-fibers firing. Hence, they is a possible world where pain exists and c-fibers do not, which implies that they are not identical, because if they were identical, it would be contradictory to affirm the existence of a possible world W where both P exists and P does not exist (if P stands for pain).
And how could we not be in pain if we imagine we are in pain? Someone else may of course affirm that I am in pain, and of course in the strict Wittgensteinian sense that is the only real meaning of pain, but again, it is possible to imagine being in pain and having no one believe me.

]]> By: Chris Sarnowski http://www.framingbusiness.net/archives/406/comment-page-1#comment-29702 Chris Sarnowski Mon, 18 Jan 2010 10:31:01 +0000 http://framingbusiness.net/?p=406#comment-29702 I've gone and skimmed through Naming and Necessity again. If I understand Kripke right, he seems to be saying that we can imagine the following: there are two possible worlds, identical in every physical detail (and we don't have to worry about how we describe the physical world - maybe we can't describe it in any finite way), but in one world there is a particular bare sensation of pain and in the other world there is not. If that is what he is saying, I think he's wrong. If it's not what he's saying, it's not clear to me what a Materialist is obliged to explain. I’ve gone and skimmed through Naming and Necessity again. If I understand Kripke right, he seems to be saying that we can imagine the following: there are two possible worlds, identical in every physical detail (and we don’t have to worry about how we describe the physical world – maybe we can’t describe it in any finite way), but in one world there is a particular bare sensation of pain and in the other world there is not.

If that is what he is saying, I think he’s wrong. If it’s not what he’s saying, it’s not clear to me what a Materialist is obliged to explain.

]]> By: Chris Sarnowski http://www.framingbusiness.net/archives/406/comment-page-1#comment-29686 Chris Sarnowski Sun, 17 Jan 2010 22:49:16 +0000 http://framingbusiness.net/?p=406#comment-29686 Why must Materialism hold that a physical description of the world is a complete description of it? A description of something is not the thing itself. That is, I think that there are no mental states (in the sense of some ghostly state that continues in the absence of physical existence), but not necessarily that we will ever be able to describe them completely in purely physical terms. But that's because mental states (in the common sense) can be very complex, and just may not line up exactly with physical states. The whole notion of "qualia" is also controversial. We do not always have "a sort of direct awareness of the nature of such qualitative mental states". I'll at least say that there are cases where someone doesn't know if they're in pain or not, and I think that's enough to call the notion of qualia into question. If M holds herself stiffly, say, and winces, but denies (sincerely) that she is in pain, I think it's very plausible that an observer would determine she really is in pain, and further that M might agree later that she had been in pain at that time but didn't realize it. This doesn't directly support Materialism, but I think it's a problem for the primacy of intuitions about qualia. We can be wrong about them, so they are not as privileged as they seem. My source for much of this crazy view is Daniel Dennett, "Consciousness Explained", 1991. (I'd have to look up the publisher). Why must Materialism hold that a physical description of the world is a complete description of it? A description of something is not the thing itself. That is, I think that there are no mental states (in the sense of some ghostly state that continues in the absence of physical existence), but not necessarily that we will ever be able to describe them completely in purely physical terms. But that’s because mental states (in the common sense) can be very complex, and just may not line up exactly with physical states.

The whole notion of “qualia” is also controversial. We do not always have “a sort of direct awareness of the nature of such qualitative mental states”. I’ll at least say that there are cases where someone doesn’t know if they’re in pain or not, and I think that’s enough to call the notion of qualia into question. If M holds herself stiffly, say, and winces, but denies (sincerely) that she is in pain, I think it’s very plausible that an observer would determine she really is in pain, and further that M might agree later that she had been in pain at that time but didn’t realize it. This doesn’t directly support Materialism, but I think it’s a problem for the primacy of intuitions about qualia. We can be wrong about them, so they are not as privileged as they seem.

My source for much of this crazy view is Daniel Dennett, “Consciousness Explained”, 1991. (I’d have to look up the publisher).

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